Supply Chain Attacks Are the New Frontier
SolarWinds. Log4j. Codecov. XZ Utils. Supply chain attacks exploit the trust between software components. When you deploy a container image, you're trusting: the base image maintainer, every package in the dependency tree, the CI/CD pipeline that built it, and the registry that stored it. Any of these can be compromised.
For regulated enterprises, the EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) makes supply chain security a legal requirement with the September 2026 reporting deadline approaching.
The Supply Chain Security Stack
Sigstore — Signing & Verification
Sigstore is an open-source project (Linux Foundation) that makes signing and verifying software artifacts free and easy:
- cosign: Sign and verify container images and other OCI artifacts
- Rekor: Immutable transparency log — every signature is recorded publicly, providing tamper-evident audit trail
- Fulcio: Certificate authority that issues short-lived certificates based on OIDC identity (no key management needed)
Keyless signing: Sigstore's killer feature. Developers sign with their GitHub/Google/Microsoft identity — no GPG keys to manage, rotate, or lose. The ephemeral certificate ties the signature to a verified identity.
SLSA Framework
Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts — a graduated framework for supply chain integrity:
- SLSA Level 1: Build process documented. Provenance exists but isn't verified.
- SLSA Level 2: Build process authenticated. Provenance generated by a hosted build service.
- SLSA Level 3: Hardened builds. Build platform provides strong assurances — hermetic, reproducible, auditable.
- SLSA Level 4: Two-person review + hermetic builds. Highest assurance level.
Target for regulated enterprises: SLSA Level 3 is the practical target. Achievable with Tekton Chains, GitHub Actions provenance, or GitLab's CI/CD with signing.
SBOM — Software Bill of Materials
- What: A machine-readable inventory of every component in your software — libraries, frameworks, OS packages, transitive dependencies
- Formats: CycloneDX (OWASP) and SPDX (Linux Foundation) are the two standards
- Generation: Trivy, Syft, or build-tool integrations generate SBOMs automatically
- Verification: Attach SBOMs as signed attestations to container images (cosign attest)
- Consumption: Dependency-Track or Grype can scan SBOMs for known vulnerabilities
CRA requirement: Manufacturers must provide SBOM documentation (top-level dependencies minimum). This is mandatory from December 2027, but vulnerability reporting obligations start September 2026.
End-to-End Pipeline
- Build: CI pipeline builds container image in hermetic environment
- Scan: Trivy scans for vulnerabilities and generates SBOM
- Sign: cosign signs the image with keyless signing (Sigstore)
- Attest: cosign attaches SBOM and provenance as signed attestations
- Store: Push signed image + attestations to OCI-compliant registry
- Verify: Kubernetes admission controller (Kyverno/OPA) verifies signature and attestations before allowing deployment
- Monitor: Continuous SBOM scanning in production for newly disclosed vulnerabilities
Kubernetes Recipes
A practical guide for container orchestration and deployment by Grzegorz Stencel & Luca Berton (Apress).
Watch on Skillshare →Getting Started
- Start with container image signing — Add cosign signing to your CI pipeline (one step, 5 minutes)
- Generate SBOMs — Add Trivy or Syft SBOM generation to your build process
- Deploy admission control — Kyverno image verification policy to block unsigned images
- Set up SBOM monitoring — Dependency-Track for continuous vulnerability monitoring of your SBOM inventory
- Document your SLSA level — Assess your current level and create a roadmap to Level 3
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Luca Berton